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Egalitarianism and the Great Recession 
A Tale of Missed Connections? 
 
Introduction 
While there were some notable exceptions, 1 the Great Recession2 has failed to generate widespread 
interest among egalitarian3 political philosophers.  This is not entirely surprising given the way in 
which most of the empirical literature elucidated the causal mechanisms that brought the economic 
system in the US (and resultantly, much of the rest of the world) to the brink of collapse. Some of the 
most important themes with which egalitarians are concerned, such as the distribution of socially 
valuable resources,4 did not appear to feature in the reconstructions provided by the empirical 
literature and presented in the public debate.  
The main aim of this paper is  to act as a corrective to the aforementioned lack of interest by 
showing that economic inequality has an important part to play when we think about the causes of the 
largest economic downturn since the 1930s. In order to do so, the paper provides an accessible 
analysis of a new strand of empirical research into the causes of the crisis. This new literature, which 
has largely gone unnoticed by the broader philosophical community, maintains that the main driver 
of financial instability is income and wealth inequality coupled with the stagnation of real income5  
for low and middle income groups. Building on this empirical research, the paper puts forward six 
connections between egalitarian political philosophy broadly construed, and the findings of the new 
literature it surveys. These connections are understood as operating in two directions: that is, they 
                                                 
1
 For example, see Ned Dobos, Christian Barry and Thomas Pogge (eds.), Global Financial Crisis: The Ethical Issues 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
2
 A recession is usually defined as a generalised decline in economic activity leading to a fall in GDP for two or more 
consecutive quarters (i.e. six months). The Great Recession can be defined as the recession that started in December 2007 
within the US economic system and subsequently spread to the rest of the world.  
3
 By ‘egalitarian’ – which I define more extensively in the final section of the paper – I refer to any approach that finds 
political equality, equality of status and, more broadly, the idea of equal citizenship, normatively relevant. Here see 
especially Elizabeth Anderson, ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, Ethics 109 (1999), pp. 287–337, and Martin O’Neill, 
‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (2008), pp. 119–56.  
4
 The expression ‘socially valuable resources’ is employed here as a placeholder that is meant to encompass all currencies 
of distributive justice.  
5
 Real income can be defined as nominal income adjusted for inflation.  
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both provide reasons for egalitarians to play a larger role in debates concerning the moral aspects of 
financial instability, and also offer valuable insights to egalitarians to reorient their position 
concerning central facets of their arguments.  
The empirical narrative presented in this paper: 1) reinforces the instrumental case against 
income and wealth inequality recently investigated by egalitarians;6 2) provides further evidence of 
the centrality of the structural (as opposed to interactional) approach to the moral appraisal of 
economic cooperation; 3) pushes egalitarians to deepen their concern for the relationship between 
equality of status and consumption choices; 4) regarding the relationship between money and 
politics, invites a shift away from electoral politics and towards market regulation and the associated 
phenomena of regulatory capture; 5) provides evidence that the egalitarian approach is important 
even from a broadly efficiency-friendly perspective; and, relatedly, 6) shows that egalitarian 
approaches, by focusing on the implications of income and wealth inequality for financial instability, 
can offer a powerful rejoinder to recent realist critiques by pointing out that excessive levels of 
income and wealth inequality can potentially lead to losses of legitimacy and civic peace.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a short overview of the most commonly 
cited explanatory factors of the Great Recession, with a specific focus on the American financial 
system, which highlights a shared aspect of these explanations: the lack of a long-term perspective on 
the root causes that have allowed more proximate empirical phenomena within the financial system 
to act as triggers for the crisis. The principal empirical alternative is then presented. I start with a 
brief survey of the main indicators of income and wealth inequality coupled with the relative 
stagnation of low- and middle-income families (section 2). I then move on to explain the connection 
between economic inequality and financial instability (section 3). In sections 4-7 I explore the 
aforementioned connections between egalitarian political philosophy and the empirical narrative of 
the crisis presented in the first part of the paper. 
                                                 
6
 See O’Neill, ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, and op. cit., ‘The Facts of Inequality’ (review article), Journal of 
Moral Philosophy 7 (2010), pp. 397–409. 
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1. The Usual Explanations and What They Fail to Tell Us 
Most accounts of the Great Recession have tended to focus on the evolution of financial markets over 
the past three decades.7 Such accounts standardly recall the following factors: a) excessive build-up 
of systemic risk due to securitization; b) bad lending practices, especially in the real estate market 
(e.g. predatory lending); c) financial deregulation; d) poor oversight of existing regulators; e) flawed 
use of risk models and epistemic deficiencies more broadly construed; f) lack of transparency in 
financial instruments and markets (e.g. the use of complex derivatives contracts and ‘over the 
counter’ markets); g) technological innovation (e.g. computerization of financial markets); h) capital 
movement liberalization coupled with the rise of China and the global ‘savings glut’ determined by 
current account imbalances. If we look for explanations in terms of the organizational structures of 
large financial institutions and how they relate to the wider economic system we could also add: i) 
principal-agent problems in governance structures; j) flawed short-term systems of incentives for the 
institutions’ senior management; k) moral hazard caused by implicit guarantees provided to 
systemically relevant institutions (i.e. the ‘too big to fail’ problem); l) rating agencies’, accounting 
firms’ and financial firms’ multiple conflicts of interest.  
A shared feature of these factors pertains to how financial markets have evolved over time. It 
is not surprising, then, that to the extent that political philosophy has been involved in the discussion, 
it has been limited to condemning specific practices within the financial system or, at most, to 
                                                 
7
 See Andrew W. Lo, ‘Reading About the Financial Crisis: A 21-Book Review’, Journal of Economic Literature 50 
(2012), pp. 151–78; Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Paul 
Muolo and Mathew Padilla, Chain of Blame: How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage and Credit Crisis (New York: 
Wiley, 2010); Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm, Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance (New 
York: Penguin, 2010); Mark Jickling, ‘Causes of the Financial Crisis’ (2009); Richard Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: 
The Crisis of ’08 and the Descent into Depression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Gillian Tett, 
Fool’s Gold: How Unrestrained Greed Corrupted a Dream, Shattered Global Markets and Unleashed a Catastrophe 
(London: Abacus, 2009); Charles R. Morris, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers, and the Great 
Credit Crash (New York: Public Affairs, 2008); Richard Bitner, Confessions of a Subprime Lender: An Insider’s Tale of 
Greed, Fraud and Ignorance (New York: Wiley, 2008); Robert J. Shiller, The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global 
Financial Crisis Happened and What to Do About It (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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evaluating the broader context in which significant cases of moral hazard were allowed to develop.8 
However, often evading public scrutiny, especially by those concerned with the moral problems 
exposed by the crisis, is the matter of situating the financial sector’s evolution in a long-term 
narrative. That is to say, even accepting that the Great Recession had its proximate causes in the 
financial system, one is entitled to ask why such evolutions have taken place. What the usual 
explanations of the crisis fail to provide is an account of the social, economic and political 
circumstances that led those factors (the proximate causes) to play the part they did in precipitating 
the crisis.9 An alternative long-term structural explanation can be found in the relation, developed 
recently by a large body of empirical literature, between the income stagnation of low- and middle-
income groups coupled with rising levels of inequality.  
 
2. The Fact(s) of Rising Inequality 
In most western economies (and particularly that of the US), income and wealth inequality have been 
on the rise since the 1970s. The latter trend has been coupled with income stagnation for those at in 
the middle and at the bottom of the income distribution.10 In order to gain a clearer picture of the 
magnitude of these phenomena, let us firstly consider income distribution. Professional economists 
often use  the proportion of total income going to the top decile of the income distribution as a 
fraction of total income as a proxy for income inequality. According to Emmanuel Saez,11 the top 
decile’s share of total income has been steadily increasing over the last forty years.12 In 2007 the top 
                                                 
8
 See Loren E. Lomasky, ‘Liberty After Lehman Brothers’, Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2011), pp. 135–65. 
9
 Some may object that at least one of the factors I have cited above can be considered a long-term explanation, in that the 
global savings glut can be seen as the result of a long-term shift in economic power from West to East (see Don Ross, 
‘Should the Financial Crisis Inspire Normative Revision?’, Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2010), pp. 399–418). 
Be that as it may, the explanation remains unconvincing. Given that many Western economies could access capital more 
cheaply because of the so-called savings glut, it seems an unhelpful way of differentiating the US from other countries 
(see John E. Roemer, ‘Ideology, Social Ethos, and the Financial Crisis’, Journal of Ethics 16 (2012), pp. 273–303).  
10
 See Thomas Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Sandy Brian 
Hager, ‘What Happened to the Bondholding Class? Public Debt, Power and the Top One Per Cent’, New Political 
Economy 19 (2014), pp. 155–82.  
11
 Emmanuel Saez, ‘Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States’ (2013). 
12
 See also Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, ‘Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998’, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 118 (2003), pp. 1–40. 
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10 per cent in the US was enjoying the same share of total income as just before 1929 – a proportion 
that is considered historically very high. Today, even accounting for the recent crisis, it is roughly 50 
per cent of total income. Professional economists and political scientists also refer to the Gini 
coefficient, a statistical technique that measures the dispersion between values in a frequency 
distribution, as a proxy for income distribution. When applied to income levels the Gini coefficient 
provides a comprehensive approximation of inequality, with 0 denoting perfect equality (i.e. 
everyone has the same income), while 1 expresses perfect inequality (i.e. only one person has all the 
income). The evolution of the Gini coefficient in the case of the US illuminates, once again, a 
relatively clear trajectory. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the US’s Gini coefficient has 
changed from 0.385 to 0.470 over the last forty years. Though this may appear to be an insignificant 
variation, it should be borne in mind that the Gini coefficient is a very ‘dense’ tool to measure 
income inequality; most of the values the index can take are not, strictly speaking, economically or 
politically plausible.  
Similar conclusions can be reached concerning wealth distribution. Let us consider wealth 
distribution in the US just before the financial crisis in 2007. According to Edward N. Wolff,13 those 
in the bottom 40 per cent of the wealth distribution controlled only 0.2 per cent of total wealth, 
whereas the top 1 per cent controlled 34.6 per cent. Calculating the proportion controlled by the top 
10 per cent gives the staggering figure of 73.1 per cent of total wealth. In the US, wealth inequality is 
even greater than income inequality. This is of course to be expected: wealth is always (historically) 
more concentrated than income, and in the absence of strong social mobility, four decades of 
increasing income inequality tends to reinforce wealth disparities over time.14  
Finally, consider some of the data on income stagnation. Income inequality can be generated 
(conceptually) even in a society in which everyone is getting substantially richer. But in the case of 
                                                 
13
 Edward N. Wolff, ‘Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and the Middle-Class 
Squeeze – an Update to 2007’, Levy Economic Institute Working Paper 589 (2010). 
14
 See Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century.  
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the US in the last forty years or so, rising inequality has been coupled with a relative stagnation of the 
incomes of those towards the middle and bottom of the income distribution. Particularly striking is 
the disparity in the rise in real income for those in the bottom fifth of the income distribution 
(roughly 6 per cent) compared with those in the top quintile (roughly 80 per cent).15 This trend has 
not been significantly affected by the recent crisis, nor by the earlier dot-com bubble, with the top 1 
per cent of the income distribution capturing 86.1 per cent of real-income growth between 1993 and 
2012.16 Whatever else these trends show, they allow us to see that the increases in income and wealth 
inequality constitute some of the most important structural changes in the US economy during the 
late 20th and early 21st centuries. 
 
3. The Inequality–Crisis Connection 
The aforementioned trends are relatively clear. What remains to be seen is how economic divergence 
can create financial instability, and it is this to which I now turn. My analysis here builds on a 
growing literature that explores this link.17  
The first way in which the connection between economic divergence and financial instability 
can be understood is by examining how inequality and stagnation trends help to generate demand for 
credit. When incomes at the bottom and middle of the income distribution are stagnating, goods often 
cannot be obtained with direct payments drawing on income; thus, access to credit is necessary in 
                                                 
15
 The data is from Wisman (2013). The other quintiles have witnessed, respectively, the following income growth: 
second quintile (15.8 per cent); middle quintile (21 per cent); fourth quintile (29.5 per cent). 
16
 Saez, ‘Striking it Richer’. 
17Rémi Bazillier and Jérôme Héricourt, ‘The Circular Relationship Between Inequality, Leverage, and Financial Crises: 
Intertwined Mechanisms and Competing Evidence’, CEPII Working Paper 2014-22 (2014); Till van Treeck, ‘Did 
Inequality Cause the U.S. Financial Crisis?’ Journal of Economic Surveys 28 (2014), pp. 421–48; Cristiano Perugini, Jens 
Hölscher and Simon Collie, ‘Inequality, Credit Expansion and Financial Crises’ (2013); Jon D. Wisman, ‘Wage 
Stagnation, Rising Inequality and the Financial Crisis of 2008’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 37 (2013), pp. 921–45; 
Richard P.F. Holt, and Daphne T. Greenwood, ‘Negative Trickle-Down and the Financial Crisis of 2008’, Journal of 
Economic Issues 46 (2012), pp. 363–70; Michael Kumhof et al., ‘Income Inequality and Current Account Imbalances’ 
(2012); Virginia Maestri and Andrea Roventini, ‘Inequality and Macroeconomic Factors: A Time-Series Analysis for a 
Set of OECD Countries’ (2012); Engelbert Stockhammer, ‘Rising Inequality as a Root Cause of the Present Crisis’ 
(2012); James K. Galbraith, Inequality and Instability: A Study of the World Economy Just Before the Great Crisis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); A.B. Atkinson and Salvatore Morelli, ‘Economic Crises and Inequality’ (2011); 
Photis Lysandrou, ‘Global Inequality as One of the Root Causes of the Financial Crisis: A Suggested Explanation’, 
Economy and Society 40 (2011), pp. 323–44.  
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order for consumption (broadly defined) to be kept at stable levels.18 The prime example here is the 
housing market. When middle and low incomes stagnate, purchasing a house using income and 
savings becomes more difficult, and thus credit becomes increasingly important to achieve home 
ownership.19 In concrete terms, this demand (coupled with the demand for ‘durables’ such as cars, 
and the rising costs of college education) has shifted household debt in the US economy from 48 per 
cent of GDP in the early 1980s to around 100 per cent of GDP before the crisis,20 at an estimated 
total value of $12.5 trillion in 2009.21 The idea that rising private debt will eventually lead to 
financial-market fragility is no cliché, but is widely accepted as credible.22 
Secondly, income and wealth inequality also affect the demand for financial instruments, 
putting pressure on the financial system to innovate and diversify in order to allocate the surplus 
capital to be invested.23 From a broadly Keynesian perspective (one in which individuals do not 
spend a fixed portion of their income, independently of their income level and the general economic 
situation), those at the top of the income and wealth distribution tend to be comparatively less prone 
to consumption (i.e. they consume less as a proportion of their available resources). Thus, as income 
and wealth accumulate, the portion that is used for the purposes of consumption diminishes. While it 
is clear that the dynamics sketched here take time to come to bear on financial markets and 
eventually on the real economy, there is evidence that the long-term macroeconomic effects of a 
shock concerning relative incomes ‘increases credit demand at the bottom of the income distribution 
                                                 
18
 Wisman, ‘Wage Stagnation, Rising Inequality and the Financial Crisis of 2008’. 
19
 See also Julie Froud et al., ‘Escaping the Tyranny of Earned Income? The Failure of Finance as Social Innovation’, 
New Political Economy 15 (2010), pp. 147–64. 
20
 Branko Milanovic, ‘Income Inequality and Speculative Investment by the Rich and Poor in America Led to the 
Financial Meltdown’, Yale Global Online (2009). 
21
 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, ‘Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit’ (2013). 
22Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010); Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, ‘The Aftermath of Financial Crises’, American 
Economic Review 99 (2009), pp. 466–72; Hyman P. Minsky, ‘Stabilizing an Unstable Economy’, Hyman P. Minsky 
Archive, Paper 144 (1986); Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of 
Financial Crises, 5th edn (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005 [1978]). 
23Roemer, ‘Ideology, Social Ethos, and the Financial Crisis’, p. 294; Galbraith, Inequality and Instability; Milanovic, 
‘Income Inequality and Speculative Investment by the Rich and Poor in America Led to the Financial Meltdown’. 
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due to a consumption smoothing motive … [and at] the same time […] it increases credit supply at 
the top of the income distribution due to a wealth accumulation motive’.24  
To this point the empirical analysis presented here has concentrated on consumption patterns 
and how they affect private debt accumulation. The analysis would not, however, be complete 
without commenting on the political context in which credit supply takes place. Some of the 
empirical analyses connecting inequality and income stagnation to private debt accumulation 
highlight the importance of institutional factors.25 Credit supply is clearly affected by the institutional 
context in which financial actors operate, and is profoundly shaped by government regulation and 
intervention. An important aspect of the institutional context affecting the supply of credit is the 
general trend in financial deregulation, which allows financial institutions to expand the supply of 
credit through financial innovation. By financial deregulation we can think of a regime of free 
international capital mobility coupled with decreased supervision by national regulators of major 
financial institutions. Examples include: a) allowing traditional banks to invest deposits in 
speculative activities; b) permitting over-the-counter markets for derivatives and other complex 
financial instruments; and c) lowering capital requirements or weakening them by allowing the use of 
risk-weighted capital. In the same way, the supply of credit has also been shaped by direct 
government intervention affecting the housing finance market (particularly the implicit and explicit 
guarantees and incentives provided by the US federal government through the Federal Housing 
Administration, and the host of government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac).26  
In sum, the greater income and wealth inequality in in the US over the past four decades has 
created a large divergence in economic holdings and income and wealth stagnation for those who are 
placed in the middle and at the bottom of the income and wealth distribution. In order to keep 
                                                 
24
 Kumhof et al., ‘Income Inequality and Current Account Imbalances’, pp. 5–6. 
25Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Francesco Saraceno, ‘Inequality and Macroeconomic Performance’, OFCE/Sciences Po, Number 
2010-13 (2010). 
26Viral V. Acharya et al., Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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consumption levels stable, recourse to credit has rapidly increased, fuelled in part by the savings of 
those at the top of the income and wealth distribution and encouraged by an institutional context 
favourable to the expansion of credit supply.  
 
 
 
4. What Kind of Egalitarianism? 
Thus far I have used expressions such as ‘egalitarian’, ‘philosophical egalitarianism’ and ‘egalitarian 
political philosophy’ without providing a clear articulation of their meaning. And, as the liberal 
egalitarian church is such a broad one,27 it seems particularly necessary to delineate the ‘egalitarian’ 
label I am employing here. It should be understood as referring to a broad range of approaches in 
moral and political philosophy that share a concern with status equality and political equality, and 
with the broader ideal of equal citizenship  in which social, economic and political institutions 
express equal concern and respect for all individuals.28  
In this picture, we see society as a fair scheme of social cooperation between free and equal 
citizens.29 The main social, political and economic institutions in society should be ordered according 
to principles of justice that mandate an equal scheme of basic liberties for all, and all citizens should 
have access to the means necessary to make use of the rights and liberties formally guaranteed by 
constitutional provisions.30 Furthermore, an egalitarian political community needs to provide a 
reasonable justification for how government policies affect its citizens.31 Social, political and 
economic institutions need to be organized in such a way that the reasonable interests of all members 
                                                 
27Stuart White, Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).  
28
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Comment on Narveson: In Defense of Equality’, Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (1983), pp. 24–40. 
29
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
30
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, rev. edition, 1996).  
31
 Christopher Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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of society are given equal consideration: an ‘egalitarian deliberative constraint32’ is at the heart of a 
conception of political community as a society of equals.     
While this vision does not mandate the equal distribution of income and wealth it assigns 
great value to political and status equality. Political equality can be defined as the equal opportunity 
to influence political decision-making (and in particular, key aspects of the regulation of the 
economy) through broadly democratic deliberative procedures.33 Status equality can be defined as 
equality before the law and the protection of the basic constitutional liberties coupled with the ability 
of all citizens to conduct a materially dignified life.34  
These definitions of political and status equality are parsimonious. They do not require 
equality of effective influence over political decision-making, nor a specific kind of democratic 
process. Furthermore, they do not require equality in the distribution of socially valuable goods and 
opportunities, nor do they specify a particular type of distribution for such goods. In the same way, 
the justificatory requirement I maintain to be at the heart of the egalitarian vision provides ample 
space for variations when it comes to the judgment of which policies can realistically be considered 
to give equal consideration to each citizen’s reasonable interests. Yet, while, this conception of 
egalitarianism is underdetermined form a practical point view, it does provide some guidance for the 
real world. What it does provide is a clear sense of what is to be avoided and what we should 
consider as clear cases of injustice: inherited social hierarchies, overt political domination, and 
immense differences in material possessions in the presence of persistent poverty are unacceptable.35   
Some versions of egalitarianism – for instance, that which Martin O’Neill has cogently 
defined as Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism36 – would consider the aforementioned characteristics as part 
of the defining features of their approach. However, it is fair to say that most, if not all, the positions 
                                                 
32
 I borrow this expression from Samuel Scheffler, ‘The Practice of Equality,’ in Fourie et. al. (eds.). Social Equality 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 25. 
33
 Joshua Cohen, Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).  
34
 See A theory of Justice, p. 478. 
35
 See Jonathan Wolff, Social Equality and Social Inequality, in Fourie et. al. (eds.). Social Equality (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2015), p. 215.   
36
 O’Neill, ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’.  
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that are traditionally considered to be ‘egalitarian’ in contemporary debates (e.g. luck egalitarianism) 
would likely find space for these ideals in a fuller articulation of their conceptions of persons and 
society. Following Sen, one can say that egalitarian value commitments are often the result of 
different grounding strategies, and while egalitarians may disagree about which ground will be 
dominant in explaining the nature of egalitarianism, they will nonetheless accept that many, if not all, 
of those grounds can play some role in providing a full picture of their views.37  
What is the status of the connections between the empirical material surveyed in sections 1-3 
of this essay and egalitarian political philosophy (as elucidated in this section)? The six that I will 
highlight in the following three sections of the paper are not to be understood as unidirectional or as 
having linear implications. Rather, they should be seen as a network of links that allow egalitarians to 
reflect on the central elements of the Great Recession and at the same time on the status and 
defensibility of their concerns with income and wealth inequality.  
 
5. Instrumental Egalitarianism and Structural Fairness 
The first group of connections (1 and 2) buttresses two important themes within egalitarian political 
philosophy, namely the focus on the effects of economic inequality, and the concentration on 
structural as opposed to interactional aspects of social and economic cooperation. 
Let us begin with the first connection. A substantial and increasing corpus of recent academic 
literature has drawn attention to the negative effects of high levels of income and wealth inequality 
on such issues as social trust, mental health, life expectancy and infant mortality, obesity rates, 
children’s educational performance, teenage births, homicide levels, incarceration rates and social 
mobility.38 It should be abundantly clear that seeing these social phenomena as problematic does not 
require an egalitarian starting point. Taken together, however, they reinforce (instrumentally) the 
                                                 
37
 A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 2. 
38
 See Joseph Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (New York: Allen Lane, 2012); Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The 
Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone (London: Bloomsbury, 2009). 
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egalitarian normative case for controlling the level of income and wealth disparities.39 What they tell 
us is that income and wealth inequality can have important negative effects for some of the central 
welfare indicators and social trends in a modern democratic society. If the results provided by the 
literature I have surveyed are correct, financial instability should be categorized as one of the central 
negative effects produced by economic inequality.  
What is the relationship between these findings and the broadly egalitarian position I have 
outline above? Some would argue that a purely instrumental account of the badness of inequality 
cannot give us the whole story. For one thing there is a sense of contingency in any instrumental 
argument which will make many egalitarians uncomfortable. Simply put, a purely instrumental 
account of the value of equality would be hostage to the social scientific research that outlines the 
consequences of income and wealth differentials. For another thing, some of the ways in which 
economic inequality can have negative effects are difficult to capture if one accepts a purely 
instrumental account of the badness of inequality. These effects pertain to how inequality affects the 
relationship between citizens in terms of their status and political standing and reflect a background 
picture of political community as an association among equals. Nonetheless, even accepting that a 
purely instrumental case for the badness of inequality is incomplete, the fact that such case does not 
necessarily rest purely on egalitarian foundations is a morally and politically relevant fact. Morally, it 
allows egalitarian to construct their concern for the badness of inequality as the focal point of an 
overlapping consensus between different types of public philosophies. To cite just one example, if 
the long term effects of inequality have systematic implications for aggregate welfare, then, it should 
not be difficult to convince Utilitarians of its badness. Politically, it allows egalitarians to portray 
their concern for equality as a concern for a set of socially important and relatively concrete 
indicators that are part of persons’ everyday experience. 
                                                 
39
 O’Neill, ‘The Facts of Inequality’. 
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The second, and related, connection is that egalitarians can provide further evidence of the 
relevance of their long-standing preoccupation with the structure of social cooperation. Philosophical 
egalitarianism, at least of the (broadly) Rawlsian variety, can act as a strong corrective to the ways in 
which the public debate has addressed the ethical aspects of recent economic shocks. Thus far, much 
of the public discussion of the Great Recession’s ethical aspects have largely focused on memorable 
events such as Dick Fuld’s vilified congressional hearing, during which the former CEO of the 
collapsed Lehman Brothers defended his compensation packages (amounting over the years to more 
than $480 million), or Lloyd Blankfein’s infamous decision to allow Goldman Sachs to sell assets to 
its clients that the company itself did not believe to be financially sound. One of the main ethical 
threads running through reactions to these events was the deplorable moral character of those in the 
financial sector. While the aforementioned reactions are  understandable, it seems striking that the 
most important issues arising from the evidence surveyed above do not pertain to the moral pedigree 
of individual bankers, but to the structure of our social and economic life.  
To put it in a different way, our normative evaluations of bankers and financial institutions 
have, so far, mostly been driven by what some have called an interactional view of fairness.40 On the 
interactional view of fairness, we can essentially isolate the moral features of an action or agent and 
then judge the action or agent against our intuitive understanding of what is morally sound behviour. 
For example, we have the intuition that individuals should not be rewarded for failure and that 
negative externalities should be internalized by economic actors. This seems to explain the outrage 
generated by bankers walking away with large compensation packages from collapsing or collapsed 
companies, but also the deeply negative views of the public support received by several financial 
firms on the wake of the crisis.  
Clearly, these judgments have a place within the moral narrative of the Great Recession. At 
the same time, given the explanation of the crisis I have sketched above, they clearly cannot be the 
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end of the story. If we take the crisis to be the result of long term trends connected to rising inequality 
of income and wealth in the wider economy coupled with income stagnation for middle and low 
income households, the interactional normative benchmark will not be able to provide us with a 
complete moral evaluation of the economic system that generated the crisis in the first place. In other 
words, the interactional benchmark will simply be unable to shed light on why, for example, the 
financial system and its actors, from individuals to institutions, had the opportunity and the means to 
behave in the way that they did. The point is not to detract from the view that these agents could and 
should have acted differently, but rather to point out that they acted within a framework that was not 
necessarily simply of their own making.  
The aforementioned points are, in many ways, at the heart of the Rawlsian edifice. Rawls 
famously argued that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, namely, the set of 
basic social and political institutions that make social cooperation possible.41 One reason to focus on 
the basic structure is that it has a deep form of impact on persons’ life prospects (that is, on how they 
will fare over the course of their lives).42 A second reason is that it is difficult to fully judge the 
fairness of local agreements and individual transactions unless we know the general background 
conditions in which such agreements and transactions have taken place.43  
The more straightforward way in which the latter ideas apply to the context of the Great 
Recession is that by concentrating on specific agents and actions we are effectively missing out on 
the broader picture of how we have chosen to organize economic cooperation. And yet, following 
from the empirical material surveyed above, it is not far-fetched to claim that it is the structure of 
economic cooperation that has had the most profound effects on the genesis of the crisis rather than 
the behaviour of individual financial actors. A second way in which Rawls’ insistence on the 
importance of the basic structure is relevant is that such insistence allows us to more fully grasp the 
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circumstances in which specific economic agents were placed and thus gain a more nuanced 
understanding of their behaviour.  
Over the past few decades, egalitarians have tried to broaden their case against economic 
inequality (by citing what are often non-egalitarian arguments linked to the consequences of 
inequality) and to press home the point that one should concentrate on the structural aspects of social 
and political phenomena instead of singling out individual transactions and specific forms of 
behaviour in the economic sphere.. The egalitarian approach could strengthen its appeal if it 
expanded its examples of severe negative effects caused by economic inequality to include  the 
seismic economic events of 2007–08 - the greatest downturn of the last sixty years which brought the 
world economy to the brink of collapse. In the same way, the egalitarian approach would be 
strengthened if it was able to provide a more encompassing moral narrative of individual failures and 
financial crimes highlighted by the Great Recession – a narrative that, hopefully, could plough a 
middle course between the uncharitable public lynching of individuals and the absolutory talk that 
insists that, when all are guilty, no one can be blamed. 
 
 
6. Status and Political Equality 
The second group of connections (3 and 4) serves the purpose of reorienting some of the well-known 
egalitarian concerns with regards to the effects of economic inequality on, on the one hand, equality 
of status and self-respect, and on the other, political equality. The empirical material surveyed above 
suggests that egalitarians should pay more attention to the effects of economic inequality on 
consumption choices given that they are often used to express status relationships. In the same way, 
egalitarians should attend more closely to the relationship between money and market regulation 
instead of concentrating on the effects of income and wealth inequalities on electoral processes: 
regulatory capture is the larger evil and provides the clearest example of how social and political 
domination can be exercised in a deeply unequal society.  
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Let me start by illustrating the third connection. It suggests that a broadly egalitarian political 
philosophy should pay more attention to the relationship between equality of status and aggregate 
consumption choices. According to most egalitarians, excessive differences in income and wealth can 
produce a sense of diminished self-respect for those who have less,44 and may generate what Rawls 
calls excusable envy.45 Large economic inequalities tend to undermine citizens’ perception of 
themselves as equals before the law; they engender a sense of inevitability about one’s less 
favourable social and economic position; and can constantly remind the less well-off of the disparity 
in lifestyles and opportunities available to the different income groups in society.46 However, while 
the aforementioned reasons are well-understood aspects of the tension between economic inequality 
and equality of status, the links between the latter and consumption choices have not, so far, received 
the same level of attention. Yet, my analysis suggests that the relationship between equality of status 
and economic inequality is central, and not simply (as many have claimed) in assessing the 
implications of large differences in material holdings on individual self-respect and ultimately well-
being. Economic inequality, by affecting equality of status, may also affect the trends that pertain to 
the accumulation of private debt through consumption (and thus, following the empirical analysis 
presented above, the very stability of the economic system).  
To be sure, substantiating the latter claim would require a much closer inspection of our 
normative attitudes towards consumption choices.47 Clearly, to see equality of status as completely 
defined by material possessions suggests an unattractive picture of social life as a zero-sum game.48 
However, we cannot simply discount the fact that most consumption choices are  relational in 
character and are connected to the type of standing that individuals perceive themselves to have in 
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society. This is for at least two reasons. First, the very idea of a decent standard of living is 
impossible to define without referencing the wider social and economic context.49 Whatever is 
demanded by equality of status, materially speaking, it certainly requires citizens to lead dignified 
lives. Yet, to lead a dignified life clearly requires access to a set of material goods, and in turn, what 
is part of this set is bound to be affected by context, and more specifically, by what others in society 
‘own’.  
Second, at least in advanced capitalist economies, an increasing number of goods have 
positional aspects.50 Moreover, goods with positional aspects include several that affect people’s 
basic opportunities in social life, such as housing and, relatedly, access to secondary and tertiary 
education. In this picture, relational consumption choices can have a defensive purpose.51 As I have 
said above, we tend to find the idea of social life as a zero sum game morally unattractive. The basic 
problem is envy: we find envy morally distasteful,52 and yet envy is precisely what seems to be 
involved in seeing gains (as defined by material possessions) that occur to others as losses to 
ourselves. Thus in much of the classical literature on this theme (Rawls’ and Gauthier’s work are the 
clearest examples here) the focus has been on how to define envy and then simply find a way to filter 
it out from political principles.53 The basic reasoning seems to be that pernicious forms of ‘natural 
attitudes’ should not be allowed to influence public choices. Envy, much like cruelty, is antisocial 
form of human emotion which no moral philosophy should give weight to no matter how deeply and 
pervasively felt it happens to be.54 Not only is envy ethically pernicious, but no sincere form of 
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community seems possible (for no community that recognizably strives for some form of political 
unity) if public policies are allowed to reflect it.55 
However, the problem with positional goods is precisely that gains for others are, by 
definition, losses to oneself with respect to the goods in question. Thus when such goods grow in 
numbers and their role in determining peoples’ life prospects become more important, a certain dose 
of ‘concern’ (for lack of a better word) for how others are faring, seems justified.56 A different way 
of putting the latter point is that, given the positional character many basic goods and opportunities in 
social life, it is hard to classify those who are worried about other people’s resources and 
consumption as irrational and/or ethically pernicious. To resent others for what they have 
independently of how what they have affects us (other than by making us envious) is antisocial and 
irrational. But there is nothing antisocial or irrational in being concerned with what others have if 
what others have deeply affects what we can aspire to when it comes to basic goods and 
opportunities. 57Am I claiming that subjective losses to well-being (as a result of positional 
competition) are a sufficient ground for egalitarian concern and public regulation?58 Some clearly 
believe that they are. The losses in aggregate welfare stemming from positional competition are 
significant and this should be enough to justify policies such as, for example, targeted consumption 
taxes.59 My claim is, however, more modest. The point I wish to make is that persons can have 
morally respectable reasons to participate in positional competitions – and to recognise these reasons 
does not require us to accept antisocial or irrational motives.  
The fourth connection serves the purpose of reorienting the long-standing concern for equal 
political standing which animates much egalitarian political philosophy. More specifically, the 
egalitarian concern with the effects of money on politics needs to be more clearly oriented towards 
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understanding the specific phenomena of regulatory capture60 that shape key aspects of market 
regulation. According to most egalitarian approaches, inequalities of wealth and income can have 
detrimental effects on the political process.61  
More specifically, large imbalances in wealth and income can come to limit the range of 
available options for those who have less. Following Scanlon, 62 we can say that the wealthy can 
come to exercise an undue level of control over the outcomes of decision-making that affect the 
entire population: from the allotment of resources to public education to the extent of protection 
offered by the welfare state, the voice of the rich is often heard more loudly than the voice of the 
poor.  Second, there is what Charles Beitz among others has called procedural unfairness. 63 The 
latter refers to the conditions under which deliberative and competitive processes that lead to 
decision-making take place. To use a familiar example, political campaigns in which private 
contributions can be unlimited will often favour the election of officials closely aligned with the 
political agenda of the well-off citizens disproportionately.64 Third, money can act as an agenda setter 
because the ‘voice’ of those who are able to input significant financial resources into political 
campaigns will tend to be associated with a higher likelihood of political success.65 Fourth, money 
can be an important way of creating support for one’s views in the public sphere and to lobby the 
legislative process.66  
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At the same time, a large part of the empirical literature on the causes of the crisis has focused 
on the deregulation of the financial system. As we have seen, many of the analyses within this 
paper’s broad framework point out that shocks to relative income affect demand for credit and for 
financial instruments, but that private debt accumulation cannot be fully explained in the absence of 
institutional factors that are favourable to the expansion of credit supply. The question that must be 
asked, then, is whether we can trace the decisions affecting those institutions favourable to the 
expansion of credit supply to the concentration of resources at the top. This is a central tenet of some 
of the most powerful analyses of regulatory capture by the financial system.67 According to Simon 
Johnson and James Kwak, there is a long-standing and pervasive historical relationship between the 
financial sector and the political process, one in which the ‘political influence of Wall Street helped 
create the laissez-faire environment in which the big banks became bigger and riskier, until by 2008 
the threat of their failure could hold the rest of the economy hostage’.68 The point of paying more 
attention to regulatory capture is not to ask political philosophers to become political scientists. 
Rather, the basic idea is that the concern with equal political standing which animates much 
contemporary egalitarianism can be less abstractly and more powerfully articulated and illustrated if 
one attends to the structural relationships between private agents and their regulators in key economic 
sectors, rather than (simply stated) as referring to campaign financing and electoral processes broadly 
understood.  
 
7. Efficiency and Ideal Theory 
The last group of connections (5 and 6) highlights the ways in which egalitarians can gain from the 
alternative analysis of the crisis that I have presented. Lack of concern for economic efficiency and 
the excessive moralisation of political life have often been depicted as two of the least attractive 
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features of egalitarian political philosophy. And yet the recent financial crisis, and the evidence that 
explain its causes in terms of the outcome of sustained economic inequality, may suggest that these 
concerns are overblown. The profound and lasting effects of the crisis on output and employment 
suggest a more nuanced view of the so called trade-off between equality and efficiency. In a similar 
way, the crisis has dented the perceived legitimacy of the economic system as a whole and has thus 
reinforced the link between economic inequality and the (in-)stability of political institutions.  
Let me start with egalitarianism’s putative hostility towards efficiency. The empirical material 
we have surveyed in sections 1-3 tells us that increased economic divergence does not simply 
represent one of the morally problematic outcomes of the evolution of the US economic system over 
time, but one of the very causes of the crisis itself. This being so, egalitarian political philosophy 
could play a more extensive role in the analysis of modern economic systems. Its concerns need not 
be limited to the analysis of the fact of inequality from a moral point of view, but can be extended to 
the implications of such inequality and how they bear on economic stability. Put differently, a 
concern for economic inequality, at least in the context of a modern financialized economy, can be 
depicted as coextensive with a concern for the very functioning of the economic system, not simply 
the analysis of its moral features or properties. This, in the first instance, would allow egalitarians to 
deflect some of the typical concerns raised about their view of market capitalism. One particularly 
worrisome complaint is that being an egalitarian entails accepting a specific answer to what Okun 
famously called the trade-off between equality and efficiency, namely, that we should sacrifice 
efficiency for the sake of equality.69  
Following Le Grand, a well-established reply to the latter accusation has been to point out that 
the conflict between equity (here understood as a measure of equality) and efficiency is, at best, a 
conceptual confusion.70 If by efficiency we refer to the way in which we pursue several socially 
valuable objectives at the same time, then, it is what we can call a second-order value. Namely, 
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efficiency often describes how we pursue what we deem socially valuable not something we deem 
socially valuable per se. If we accept this understanding of efficiency, then, there cannot be a trade-
off between efficiency and equity. However, even if we reject Le Grand’s argument, the recent 
financial crisis has highlighted something important about the (putative) trade-off between equality 
and efficiency. If the link between economic inequality and financial instability is robust, then, the 
trade-off may, in the end, be much less (empirically) acute than many have thought. More broadly, 
being egalitarians may not require us to lose sight of the value of economic efficiency, or of the 
relevance of aggregate welfare. To the contrary, it may be the case that, at least with regards to the 
current distribution of resources in several western economies, paying attention to efficiency and 
aggregate welfare requires us to use criteria of institutional evaluation that are concerned with 
relative economic standing. In other words, we may need to pay attention to equality for the sake of 
efficiency.  
Of course, the latter will depend upon which definition of efficiency we draw upon and for 
what purpose.71 For example, using the traditional Pareto criterion to argue in favour of the reduction 
of income and wealth dispersion is clearly a conceptual non sequitur. If financial instability is the 
long-term result of inequalities in wealth and income, and assuming that at least some reduction of 
economic inequality would be necessary to tame this structural connection, it is unlikely that 
everyone would be better off as a result.72 However, an argument for a more egalitarian society being 
attuned to a concern for efficiency could be formulated by using the weaker (and usually much more 
realistic) Kaldor–Hicks criterion. To be sure, it would be a highly speculative exercise to 
counterfactually prove that a less unequal economic system is (other things being equal) more 
efficient as per the Kaldor–Hicks criterion. Nonetheless, it is far from inconceivable that the 
counterfactual question about comparative efficiency could be answered in favour of a more 
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egalitarian distribution of income and wealth given the extensive losses of output and employment 
that generally follow in the wake of banking crises and financial distress.  
Relatedly, the sixth connection is that egalitarian political philosophers can call attention to 
how their concerns for relative economic standing need not be grounded solely in reasons that pertain 
to ideal theory. In recent years, political philosophers have been increasingly preoccupied with 
methodological questions related to the development of normative principles. One way to frame this 
debate is to see it as discussion pertaining to the relative merits of ideal and non-ideal theorising. The 
distinction between ideal and non-ideal theorising is however a multifaceted one.73 By ideal theory 
we can refer to those theories that presuppose full compliance with the content of the principles that 
the theory argues for. In this picture, a non-ideal theory would then refer to a theory that works under 
the assumption of partial compliance. A second sense in which a theory can be ‘ideal’ is by aiming at 
describing some form of perfectly just state of affairs. Here, a non-ideal theory would instead 
concentrate on transitional aspects of political morality, namely, on providing guidance to make 
incremental (normative) progress possible without necessarily trying to define what a perfectly just 
society looks like. Finally, a theory can be ideal because its prescriptions are utopian in the sense that 
they reject the idea that facts about human psychology and political reality can act as constraints to 
the content of basic political principles. In this final sense of the term a non-ideal theory is simply a 
kind of theory that allows (at least some) political circumstances to influence the content of its 
prescriptions.   
The recent debate between so-called liberals and so-called realists has also highlighted a 
fourth sense in which mainstream political philosophy fails to be political in the right way. .74 
Egalitarian liberalism, it is often said, is tantamount to an artificial moralization of political life, one 
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that simply fails to attend to a proper political morality and to the nature of politics itself. One of the 
favourite targets of these complaints is the concern with justice and equality. However, if the 
evidence I have surveyed is sound, the concern with equality is not simply a concern with the correct 
understanding of justice in ideal theory, but can be translated into a concern with stability and 
legitimacy. 75 An economic system that is characterized by significant economic inequality may lead 
to recurrent financial instability. In turn, the losses of output and employment that are associated with 
these episodes of financial instability will put pressure on the support that ordinary citizens need to 
provide to their social and political institutions, and which is necessary for the ongoing process of 
social cooperation to continue peacefully over time. In other words, the concern with the levels of 
material equality that are prevalent in a democratic society cannot simply be depicted as idealistic 
fantasy superimposed on real politics from the ivory tower of academic debate. If civic peace and 
legitimation are central to a more realistic understanding of political life, then a concern with the 
level of material differences in a modern financialized economy may simply be something that we 
are required to develop. Of course, the latter point will not necessarily settle the debate between 
egalitarians and liberals: egalitarians may still care about equality and see stability and legitimacy as 
merely having derivative status as by-products of a more equal social society. Realists may still see 
the value of equality as merely instrumental. Nonetheless, it would highlight that the potential for 
reconciliation is higher than what may have initially thought.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The overall aim of this paper has been both reconstructive and explorative. I have attempted to 
highlight the link between a specific account of the Great Recession that is increasingly gaining 
purchase in the empirical literature, and philosophical egalitarianism. Elucidating these connections 
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should lead us, I hope, to ask different questions about the economic and political context that 
preceded one of the worst economic shocks since the 1920s.  
 
